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Eliciting and Applying Misusability Cases
The Problem Current design techniques fail to engage developers in thinking about how their design decisions lead to both security and usability issues 
Our Approach
Use design data to develop scenarios 
describing problems which lead to 


























Identify obstructions causing the 
Misusability Cases, and elicit goals to 
mitigate them
Situating Misusability Cases
Misusability Cases do not exist in isolation, nor are they used 
during the early stages of requirements analysis.  We assume 
goals have been elicited corresponding to the requirements a 
system needs to satisfy.  We also assume that use cases [1] 
have been elicited describing episodes of system behaviour 
carried out by actors, and one or more personas [2] have been 
developed to contextualise these actors.
Misusability Cases are situated within the IRIS Meta-Model 
[3].  This meta-model illustrated how concepts from 
Requirements Engineering, Information Security, and HCI 
concepts can be integrated to support the elicitation and 
specification of secure system requirements. 





2. Using Toulmin's Model of Argumentation [4,5], model characteristics of 
scenario where misusability causes a persona to endanger the system
Brian had spent most of the morning preparing data-sets ready for ingest into various sources.  Some of the 
meta-data was for deep meta-data for local databases, while others were summarised meta-data targetted 
for the Data Directory.  He hoped to use standards and guidelines on the gateway, but he was disappointed 
by the lack of anything useful that would help him.  Never mind, Brian managed to organise his meta-data 
into the layout he managed to induce from some the XSLT scripts he downloaded.  
After finally finishing the preparation of his data-sets, Brian created the mapping files needed for the data 
ingest process.  Fortunately, most of them were very similar so most of the files he used were based on an 
initial template he created for one of his data-sets.  Unfortunately, some of the policy setting were slightly 
different and, in the mapping file for the metadata for DSS, Brian inadvertently set a number of frequency 
metadata variables in the as publically accessible.
Brian entered a URI he had been provided for uploading meta-data to the Data Directory, and logged in 
using the data manager credentials.  Brian then specified the mapping file corresponding to the meta-data 
he wanted to upload and hit the Upload button.  Several minutes after clicking the Upload button, Brian 
received a message from the gateway saying the meta-data had been uploaded.
3. Write a Misusability Case based on the elicited argumentation model which 
operationalises one or more related use cases
































Misusability Cases are currently being applied to explore the impact of design ambiguity and user expectations about security and privacy on the EU FP7 webinos project.
Future Work
• Misusability Cases were used in a case study to help elicit security requirements for a portal for sharing medical study data.
• Goal models, system documentation, and related usability design artifacts were used as data sources for Misusability Case elicitation and specification.
• The CAIRIS Requirements Management tool [7] was updated to support the elicitation and visualisation of argumentation model elements.
• Of the 21 Obstacles and 6 key security requirements elicited, 15 obstacles and 4 requirements were elicited from Misusability Cases alone. 
Misusability: design decisions leading to 
usability problems and system misuse
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No best practice documentation
Disappointed by lack of help when needed
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Distributed best practice 
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Unfamiliar with shared 
data portal concept.
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